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Abstract: 
Much has been made about a revival of Mackinderian geopolitics in Eurasia, largely centred on 
struggles over access to energy resources and rooted in a territorial understanding of space. This 
paper proposes that the conceptual political cartography of Eurasia is indeed largely being 
rewritten, but conventional understandings of space, territory, and resources are insufficient in 
providing insight into a changing geopolitics. We interrogate the geographical logics of Russia's 
role as energy provider to Europe by focusing specifically on the provision of gas to Europe via 
Nord Stream, a new underwater pipeline that is scheduled to go online by late 2011. Drawing on 
debates in human geography on relational/topological views of space, and on the “splintering 
urbanism” thesis, the paper describes a rapidly evolving networked space that effectively 
“splinters” the territorial integrity of the region and thereby complicates notions of Eurasian 
geopolitics that emphasise proximity, territorial hegemony, and state-centric international 
relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia has 
undergone profound changes. In broad terms, perhaps the most momentous shift has been from 
the hardened binary of East and West – the post–World War II building of spheres of influence 
that largely rendered middle ground literally and figuratively impossible – into what might best 
be described as the contemporary geopolitics and geoeconomics of privileged partnerships and 
networked ties. At the core of this paper is a concern for how energy figures into this new 
geopolitical landscape and what a changing energy picture means for how this landscape is 
conceptualised by geographers and non-geographers alike. Our primary goal is to draw attention 
to the shortcomings of imagination in how these relationships – nascent and still evolving as they 
are – are conceived, and then propose how this understanding might be enriched by 
incorporating recent explorations in human geography of networks and topological 
understandings of spatial connectivity. 
Energy, in particular natural gas, plays a central role in shaping this contemporary landscape, and 
there is no shortage of analyses on the role of energy in Europe and wider Eurasia. 1 Unlike oil, 
which is traded on a global market and is most often transported by ship, rail, and highway, 
natural gas is still typically a commodity traded within the context of bilateral contracts and via 
dedicated infrastructure (i.e., pipelines). 2 Though often taken for granted, pipelines make 
possible what the German-American philosopher of technology Albert Borgmann defines as “the 
good life.” 3 They do so as part of the “background of technology,” out of sight and mind for 
most consumers, even though it is this very network that ensures that when Europeans turn up a 
thermostat or open radiator valves, their interior spaces become comfortably warm. 
Consequently, and in spite of their relative invisibility, the importance of pipelines continues to 
grow as natural gas consumption increases and, more importantly, domestic fuel sources, such as 
the gas fields of the North Atlantic, approach the point of being uneconomical to service. 
Proposed pipeline projects in Europe, such as Nord Stream, Nabucco, South Stream, and Amber, 
no longer simply represent the anonymous technological conduits that bring warmth to living 
rooms in Budapest, Berlin, and Brussels, but rather have taken on political identities of their 
own. These projects symbolise not only literal warmth, but also figurative well-being or, 
alternatively, coolness in particular international relations. 
This paper brings these two topics – pipelines and geopolitics – into dialogue within the larger 
context of debates in human geography over topological understandings of space. Geopolitics 
has for the most part been omitted from these discussions, 4 which, given its historical focus on 
how territory and territorial frameworks influence politics, is not entirely surprising. 5 But 
networked energy infrastructures challenge the ways in which space and territory in post–Cold 
War Eurasia must be understood. The images of Eurasia 6 that have emerged in recent years, 
particularly in popular renderings of the geopolitics of energy, as a geostrategic chessboard, need 
to be problematised. Based on our reading of pipeline networks, we propose how a more 
geographically sensitive (and accurate) theoretical rendering of Eurasian space might be 
achieved. We follow preliminary suggestions made by others 7 in arguing that the geographical 
significance of the vast gas infrastructure resembles something akin to what Graham and Marvin 
describe in their “splintering urbanism” thesis, but at a different scale. 8 Their thesis proposes 
that the “modern infrastructural ideal” has given way to an unbundling of infrastructure and 
bypassing of non-valuable, less powerful users in order to ensure supply to valuable, powerful 
users, particularly in urban spaces. This paper is concerned with “splintering” of territorial space 
at a larger spatial scale, but there are nevertheless parallels with the developments examined by 
Graham and Marvin, along with others. Such a splintering, examined below, has implications for 
places throughout Eurasia, but particularly for those places that are bypassed by networked 
infrastructure such as pipelines. Like telecommunications networks, gas pipelines are 
simultaneously embedded in the territories through which they pass – subject to what might be 
termed political geographic frictions that can interrupt the provision of the service or commodity 
to its intended consumers – but they can also be nearly disembedded from their territorial 
contexts. It is this latter element that has been neglected in prior engagements with pipelines. In 
sum, events on the ground have surpassed the explanatory value of traditional geopolitical 
approaches, which nevertheless have enjoyed growing cachet in certain circles. 
In the case of the provision of natural gas to valued consumers in Western Europe, it is the 
intermediary places that are of most concern here. Where popular geopolitical interpretations are 
most correct is in positing that the provision of gas from source to end-user cannot be removed 
from political geography; sovereign states such as Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, etc., have interests, 
and these interests do not necessarily align with economic considerations that cause companies 
to build infrastructure projects such as Nord Stream. In short, a pipeline is much more than just a 
pipe. 
We therefore also build on recent work seeking an intervention by geographers on the topic of 
geopolitics and energy networks 9 and on a still-emerging field of research in human geography 
on the ways in which networked infrastructures are deterritorialised – disembedded from the 
territories through which they pass – but then also reconstituted or “reterritorialised” in different 
ways. 10 This stands in contrast to more conventional readings of the geopolitics of energy, 
described briefly below. Relational thinking with regard to networks has become somewhat of a 
mantra across subdisciplines in human geography, 11 and insofar as it has challenged the 
methodological and ontological privileging of the nation-state 12 and the uncritical use of 
Mackinderian geopolitics, 13 this development should be welcomed by political geographers. 
Using the specific example of the Nord Stream pipeline, scheduled to go online in late 2011, we 
question what these energy arrangements, agreements, and infrastructures tell us about the 
realignment of spatial relations in contemporary Eurasia. 
MACKINDER ASCENDANT 
At the core of any analysis of Eurasian geopolitics must be the question of the relationship 
between Europe and Russia. One particularly visible way in which this relationship has been 
conceived in the last decade is in a revival in “geopolitical” thinking related to the world's largest 
landmass, and energy and pipelines lie at the centre of these interpretations. A range of scholars, 
politicians, and journalists alike have latched on to energy and its transport as being central 
elements of a rebirth of geopolitics across Eurasia. 
The influence of Mackinderian geopolitical thinking during the early twentieth century can 
hardly be overstated, 14 and it is enjoying a renaissance of sorts since the early 1990s in Europe 
and North America, 15 and simultaneously in Russia. 16 As has been well documented in recent 
years in centenary commemorations of his 1904 speech, 17 Sir Halford Mackinder offered a 
highly pessimistic view (for Great Britain) of how technological change (railroads) and a shifting 
balance of industrial power in Eurasia would fundamentally reshape Eurasian space in a 
strategic-geographic sense. 18 In the United States, the revalorisation of the Mackinderian legacy 
is most evident in a piece by Robert Kaplan in Foreign Policy. 19 “The Revenge of Geography,” 
as it is titled, surveys the intellectual roots of geopolitical thinking as it emerged in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and implores modern geopoliticians to “think like 
Victorians.” 
Kaplan's metageographical intervention is just one particularly visible example of this type of 
literature, and it should be noted that a number of human geographers have challenged the 
misuse of Mackinder and “geopolitics” more broadly. 20 A thorough survey of the less critical 
brand of this literature is not possible here, but four basic characteristics are evident. 
First, struggles over “spheres of influence” are underway in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 21 
Eurasia, broadly conceived, is the “world's axial supercontinent,” a “volatile” region that is a 
“decisive geopolitical chessboard.” 22 
Second, much like the imperial struggles of prior eras, the current one is “zero sum,” predicated 
on a “closed-space thinking” where the benefits to one part of the map necessarily come at the 
expense of another. 23 
Third, this geopolitical struggle is largely centred on energy and the means of transporting 
energy. Such interpretations often collapse Mackinder's focus on the Heartland and 
transportation with the nineteenth-century Great Game between Russia and Great Britain in 
Central Asia. 24 In particular, natural gas is the prize of the game, akin to the twenty-first-
century version of oil's centrality to the twentieth. 25 Daniel Freifeld argues in a piece 
provocatively entitled “The Great Pipeline Opera”: 
Unlike oil, which can be put onto tankers and shipped anywhere, gas is generally moved in 
pipelines that traverse, and are thus tethered to, geography. Because a pipeline cannot be 
rerouted, producers and consumers sign long-term agreements that bind one to the politics of the 
other, as well as to the transit states in between. In this way, today's gas war is a zero-sum 
conflict similar to the scramble for resources that divided Eurasia in the 19th century. 26 
Fourth, as part of this narrative it is often argued out that Russia possesses renewed self-
confidence and has regained its “taste for empire.” 27 Some go so far as to argue that a 
“revisionist” Russia 28 is reverting to its czarist expansionist ways, through its proxy company 
Gazprom, by signing pipeline deals and entering relationships in foreign gas markets, such as in 
Gazprom's purchase of Serbia's gas monopoly. 29 In the “war of gas pipelines,” Russia wishes to 
be best positioned to be the main provider of gas not only to Europe, but also eventually to China 
as well. 30 Its leadership, according to this train of thought, harbours megalomaniacal desires to 
monopolise the provision of energy in its spheres of influence 31 and serve as the “gatekeeper of 
Europe-bound energy resources.” 32 
The use of the geopolitical vocabulary in the media, by government officials, and by various 
other parties – as in invoking a modern “Great Game” or the insightfulness of Mackinder, who 
was so instrumental in shaping the geopolitical lens through which Eurasia has been understood 
during much of the last century – tends to elide the fact that such frameworks are firmly rooted in 
a territorial understanding of Eurasia. Yet to what extent is a network of pipes, in many ways the 
defining physical feature linking Eurasian space, territorial? 
Most important to this paper, this resurrection of a particular way of viewing geography focuses 
on the traditional concerns of classical geopolitics that emphasise territorial proximity and 
neglect other types of connectivity. As Gerry Kearns argues, these theoretical-conceptual lenses 
place too much emphasis on “the significance of contiguity.” 33 Leaving aside for a moment the 
highly informative poststructural critiques of classical geopolitics that have emerged from 
geography in the last two decades, 34 it is important to note that such narratives continue to 
shape how elites and wider populaces understand the geopolitics of the region. In new EU 
member states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as former Soviet states of Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Moldova, there is real concern about becoming yet again a “cordon sanitaire,” 35 or 
buffer zone, separating – and isolated by – the major continental powers Germany and Russia. 36 
CASE STUDY: THE NORD STREAM PIPELINE 
As illustrated above, Eurasia is still widely conceived in the popular imagination as a territorial 
space, a contiguous series of discrete power containers subject to the inexorable forces of 
geopolitics such as territorial proximity, resource access, and spheres of influence. The case we 
examine poses a fundamentally different set of issues from these traditional concerns. In the case 
of Nord Stream, a topological relationship effectively renders the intermediate territory a 
nonentity, making the nodes on either end of the connecting line disproportionately more 
important than the territory through which it passes. 
The Nord Stream project will directly link Russia and Germany via a pair of 1,220-kilometre-
long pipelines resting on the bed of the Baltic Sea for most of their route. Starting in Vyborg, 
Russia, the pipelines will traverse the exclusive maritime economic zones of Russia, Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Germany before reaching their terminus at Lubmin, near Greifswald in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany (see Figure 1), thereby avoiding waters controlled by the 
former Soviet Baltic states and Poland. 37 Construction of the first pipeline, which will transfer 
27.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas per annum, received final approval in early 2010 
and is expected to be in operation in 2011–2012. 38 The second pipeline, on which construction 
is slated to begin in 2012, will match that capacity, combining to deliver 55 bcm of natural gas 
each year to Western Europe, or about one third of the region's current imports. 39 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Map of the Nord Stream Pipeline. 
Media reports and other analyses have painted Nord Stream as an instrument of the Kremlin's 
foreign policy, 40 focusing on the lead role played by Gazprom, the state-controlled energy 
behemoth that monopolises Russia's natural gas exports and its natural gas infrastructure. Yet 
one should be careful not to exaggerate European dependence on Russian gas, and we are 
generally not sympathetic to the shriller tones in the media claiming a Russian stranglehold over 
Europe. 41 The overall share of Russian gas imports to EU countries has actually decreased as 
suppliers from North Africa and the Middle East have diversified imports somewhat. 42 
Moreover, several external developments stand to keep Russian gas from being a strategic 
weapon that could be yielded against European countries in the near term. One is a current glut 
of gas globally, especially in light of the “shale gas revolution” in North America, which has 
dried up potential markets for liquefied natural gas (LNG) there. Another is that increasing 
liberalisation of gas markets across Europe will mean that there will be heightened competition 
for access to European markets, including a more vibrant LNG market. 43 Although predicting 
the future of gas consumption is highly speculative, such forecasting seems to assume too much, 
namely that market liberalisation will in fact occur; that Asian economic growth will not divert 
much of the global gas that otherwise might go to Europe; and that investments in expensive 
LNG facilities will occur in some of the places that currently have none (i.e., Germany, 
continental Europe's largest consumer of natural gas). The fact remains that there is still high 
market segmentation – gas is still a largely nationalised system of consumption and distribution 
across the EU – and it seems unlikely that this situation will change any time soon. Given the 
unlikelihood that distribution systems will change dramatically in the near term, it seems 
probable that pipeline infrastructure, and their accompanying long-term contracts and “locked-
in” interdependencies will persist during the next few decades. 44 
Returning to the case at hand, as with other natural gas infrastructure projects, 45 Nord Stream, 
with an estimated price tag of $10 billion, 46 requires enormous up-front capital investments and 
technological transfers that can only be gained through partnership. A joint venture, with 
Gazprom maintaining a controlling 51 percent share, Nord Stream is also owned by the German 
energy companies BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas (20 percent each) and the Dutch 
company Gasunie (9 percent). Both the German and Russian governments, while having taken 
no direct financial stake, have invested political capital in the project; for Germany, convincing 
its European Union partners of the benevolence of the project was the main goal. 47 
The public relations team behind the Nord Stream consortium touts its pipeline as a guarantor of 
energy security, claiming it as “necessary” to meet future demand for natural gas in the European 
Union. 48 Indeed, according to European Commission projections, demand for natural gas 
among its member states will increase by a quarter by 2030, while domestic production 
capacities will fall by up to 40 percent, forcing the EU to find an additional 195 bcm of natural 
gas per year. 49 Deliveries of Russian gas across the Baltic Sea would cover more than a quarter 
of this gap. However, although Russia sits atop the world's largest proven natural gas reserves, 
many have questioned its ability to fill Nord Stream pipelines. 50 Nearly 90 percent of Russia's 
current natural gas production is drawn from its legacy fields in northern West Siberia, most 
notably from three “super-giant” fields – Medvezh'ye, Urengoy, and Yamburg – which, like 
North Atlantic fields, are in “irreversible decline.” 51 Gazprom says it will meet its Nord Stream 
commitments with natural gas pulled initially from the Yuzhno-Russkoye field in the Yamal-
Nenets region of West Siberia 52 and over time from the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, but 
to date the Shtokman project remains undeveloped and even under-researched. 53 
For Russia and Gazprom, as well as Western European investors, Nord Stream's provision of 
energy security is not simply a case of meeting current and forecasted customer demand, but 
more so a question of reducing the potential for network frictions in transit states. In 
approximately ten off-the-record interviews conducted in Berlin and Moscow with government 
officials and private actors with intimate knowledge of this project in the summer of 2009, there 
was unanimous confirmation of the chief rationale of this project being avoiding insecure 
intermediate locations. 54 When the Soviet Union collapsed, its former union republics assumed 
control of the energy infrastructure that had been built up on their territories in previous decades. 
Natural gas transit pipelines run across Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Ukraine in particular, 
through which 80 percent of Russia's gas exports flow, holds a key position. 55 With pipelines 
crossing their sovereign spaces, transit states are not only able to leverage fees for allowing 
natural gas to pass through their territories en route to markets downstream, but also are 
empowered to parlay their relative location into significant political capital. Currently, export 
capacity in these primary transit states is running at 80 percent; by 2015, with Nord Stream in 
operation, that figure is expected to drop to 70 percent, 56 reducing Russia's “transit 
dependence” 57 and allowing it greater flexibility within its energy network to divert natural gas 
deliveries to higher paying customers downstream. The effective “cannibalisation” of Gazprom's 
existing pipeline network, 58 at least in the short term, offers further evidence that this pipeline is 
being built for strategic reasons; market considerations are, curiously for a supposedly market-
driven company, secondary. 
The relationship with Germany is attractive. Unlike in new EU members in Eastern and Central 
Europe, where it already dominates the market, Gazprom has a lot of room to grow its shares in 
the larger Western European markets (see Figure 2). Germany is a logical (and secure) break-in-
bulk point for redistribution of gas throughout Western Europe since German partners control 
thousands of kilometres of gas pipelines. Although Gazprom and Nord Stream AG have 
portrayed the project as being purely about rational market considerations, international relations 
has also played a role in mediating the project. In Germany and Russia, the project has been 
framed as a natural outgrowth of the “special relationship” between the two countries. 59 While 
Germany sees itself as a sort of cultural interlocutor between Russia and Europe, 60 Russia 
views Nord Stream as a natural outgrowth of its long-standing historical ties with Germany. 
Figure 2 is omitted from this formatted document. 
Neighbours of these two large powers view the situation differently. Nord Stream will make 
Germany the main distributor of Russian gas within Europe, which makes the project unloved in 
Baltic states and Poland. 61 Some have raised the prospect of “energy blackmail” being used as a 
political tool. 62 In an open letter to US President Barack Obama, twenty-two prominent Central 
and Eastern European political figures, including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, registered their 
concerns about Germany and, above all, Russia's “creeping intimidation and influence-peddling 
in [their] region that could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region.” 63 These 
concerns are not without some merit: witness gas disruptions in Ukraine (1993, 1994, 2006, and 
perhaps most dramatically in 2009) and Belarus (2010), as well as supply disruptions by Russia 
to the Baltic countries when those states were seeking their independence in the early 1990s. 64 
With the bulk of Gazprom deliveries still flowing through their territories, primary transit states 
(Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) will retain a significant, if diminished, degree of power vis-à-
vis Russia. For EU's newest members, however, Nord Stream is a harbinger of potentially direr 
implications. Located on the spurs of Soviet-era pipelines, the former Warsaw Pact countries 
have had little incentive or opportunity to diversify and remain highly dependent on Russian 
natural gas imports (for example, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia all receive 100 percent of 
their natural gas from Gazprom). It is among these states that demand for natural gas has more or 
less remained flat over the past two decades, with consumption among the EU's newest members 
climbing just 3 percent between 1992 and 2008 (see Figure 3); for the three primary transit states 
in that same period, consumption dropped by more than 30 percent. At the same time, demand in 
Western Europe grew by 60 percent. Highly dependent on Russian deliveries but sluggish in 
consumption trends, the EU's most easterly contingents are rightfully concerned that Nord 
Stream signifies their relative declining importance for Gazprom. In the long term, however, it is 
the Russian gas supplier's stated intention to diversify its markets more broadly, particularly by 
connecting with the growing markets in Asia (i.e., China), that gives cause for pause in the gas-
consuming places with relatively low purchasing power. 65 
Figure 3 is omitted from this formatted document. 
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL CARTOGRAPHY OF EURASIA 
Returning briefly to Mackinder's thesis, it is worth noting that the development of empire in the 
Heartland by the Soviet Union was contingent not only upon military control and political 
influence, but also on economic development by means of infrastructures that integrated 
peripheral areas into the core. 66 Even while being dominated and subjugated, the periphery 
(here speaking of Soviet-dominated Eurasia) accrued certain material gains from modernisation, 
though infrastructure largely was used to enable resources and wealth to be transferred to the 
core for redistribution throughout the empire. In other words, not only the beginning and 
endpoint of a railroad – to draw quite intentionally on one of Mackinder's examples – witnessed 
material impacts from its existence, but also the path along which the railroad passed were part 
of the overall system of territorial integration. Clearly, Nord Stream does not fit in the same 
category. Nord Stream does not render the places in between entirely irrelevant, since questions 
over the existence of such a pipeline on the seabed involve the political mediation of 
intermediary states. Nevertheless, the new routing is purposefully of a different geographical 
character than that of its predecessors, which were firmly tied to the sovereign territories of 
intermediary states. 
Our initial question, however, remains: how do we move toward integrating the territorial and 
networked aspects of energy infrastructure? A comprehensive answer to this question is not 
possible within the confines of this paper. As a starting point, though, it is clear that energy 
infrastructure, much like telecommunications, “structure[s], frame[s], and connect[s] space,” 67 
and it does this at multiple spatial scales. One promising avenue of inquiry in enriching our 
theoretical understanding of gas pipelines can be found in scaling up some of the more 
theoretically robust examinations of infrastructure at the urban scale, such as “splintering 
urbanism,” while more thoroughly considering the sociospatial aspects of energy infrastructure 
alongside the physical. 
The basic argument of the “splintering urbanism” thesis is that non-valuable, less powerful users 
are effectively bypassed by new infrastructural networks in order to ensure supply to valuable, 
powerful users. As a result of this development, “premium networked spaces” are emerging in 
cities throughout much of the world, 68 and the builders of these networked spaces pursue the 
goal of “seamlessly interconnecting highly valued local spaces and global networks to support 
new vectors of flow and interaction between highly valued spaces and users.” 69 While 
infrastructure networks were once seen as “the very connective tissue” of the nation, serving as 
“the focus of the power, legitimacy and territorial definition of the modern nation-state,” 70 
energy infrastructure is now increasingly transnational. Indeed, the case study outlined above 
represents but a relatively small segment in a vast Eurasian pipeline network that increasingly 
transcends sovereign spaces and state borders (see Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4 Map of Eurasia's natural gas pipeline network. 
Work on splintering urbanism builds on other conceptualisations of networked space that have 
emerged in the last twenty years or so, such as Manuel Castells's work on rising inequality of the 
information age (the emergence of “black holes” and a so-called “Fourth World” of places 
outside the scope of informational capitalism). 71 The crucial thread we want to draw out from 
splintering urbanism is the notion that connectivity is coming to rival distance as an important 
spatial variable. Rather than absolute space, or topography, dictating relationships (as in a 
Mackinderian interpretation of resource distribution and power struggles), increasingly relational 
or relative space dictates who profits (and who loses out) from particular infrastructure projects. 
72 By way of analogy, the presence of a major trunk cable forming part of the internet backbone 
passing directly under your house does not necessarily ensure that you have a fast connection; 
one's access to that network is mediated at a number of points and on several levels. 73 In 
making this connection, we acknowledge the scalar leap we are making. Graham et al. explicitly 
focus on the historical legacies of infrastructure as a “public good” in cities and document the 
ways in which this idea has been challenged in recent times. 74 In addition, their focus is 
explicitly on the segmentation of urban infrastructure networks as a byproduct of broader 
processes of neoliberalisation. While the reintroduction of the free market in post-Soviet and 
other Eastern Bloc spaces clearly has also influenced the development of pipeline infrastructures 
there, it is not our wish to develop our argument under the context of neoliberalism. Rather, we 
posit that the Nord Stream case is indicative of wider developments since the latter decades of 
the twentieth century in gas pipeline infrastructure in Europe from blocs of territorial integration 
to a more fragmented networked geography (see Figure 5). 
 
FIGURE 5 Conceptual cartography of Eurasia's natural gas infrastructure. 
During the Cold War, infrastructural projects often corresponded to the geopolitical division 
separating Europe into Warsaw Pact communist countries in the East, and free market 
democracies in the West. This is evident in the first panel of Figure 5, though it must be pointed 
out that the Soviet Union began selling gas to West Germany in the early 1970s as part of Willy 
Brandt's Ostpolitik. 75 Thus, certain key aspects of the infrastructure crossed the Iron Curtain. In 
the immediate aftermath of 1989, which corresponded with a period of increasing integration of 
the European Community, there was growing interpenetration of infrastructure across the former 
Iron Curtain, as indicated in the second panel of our conceptual cartography. The last panel 
represents recent developments and, by all accounts, how pipeline infrastructures will develop in 
the future. In spite of recent EU energy initiatives designed to integrate new member states in 
Central Europe into a more integrated EU gas network (by, for example, envisioning bi-
directional flows to guard against supply disruptions), this is still very much in the 
developmental stage. For the time being, nodes of redistribution will be linked by projects such 
as Nord Stream, and areas of market growth will receive priority over rural areas and areas with 
less purchasing power. 
The parallels between what is happening at the urban scale and Eurasian pipeline developments 
go beyond the segmentation of infrastructure as such, and extend to how such segmentation can 
impact the places bypassed by these networks. An increasingly disjointed infrastructure is 
accompanied by more frequent occurrences of what Graham in recent work has called 
“disruptive politics,” or the ability of individual actors to control the movement of energy, as 
well as water and food, throughout the world. 76 Thus, the “linearity” of these networks raises 
security questions that go well beyond traditional forms of interstate conflict and open them up 
to asymmetrical forms of disruption. Increasingly, Graham argues, geopolitical power is less 
about the projection of military prowess and more about access and control of resources and 
infrastructure. Russia, it seems, is well aware of this power dynamic, and recent supply 
interruptions to Ukraine and Belarus could be interpreted as a form of disruptive politics. As the 
supply situation changes, and as political dynamics change, the future could easily hold more 
disruptive politics in store. 77 
The Nord Stream project can be perhaps best theorised as a polymorphic thing, constituted by 
social and economic relationships as well as the physical existence of steel pipe passing from 
Vyborg to Lubmin along the floor of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea – two nodes 
connected by a deterritorialised line. Each of these elements is organised at multiple 
geographical scales. Pipelines create a material network, rooted in some sense in a territorial 
context, but that is nevertheless the product of strategies of individuals, states, and businesses 
acting as part of a deterritorialised politics. Along the lines of Martin Jones, we would argue that 
flows and fixed aspects of space coexist and are mutually constitutive, not diametrically 
opposed. 78 Pipelines contribute to a “geography of accumulation,” one that arises out of 
interactions between actors who themselves are rooted in a particular historical-geographical 
context. Like other networked technologies, they link “fast” geographies while creating new, or 
further entrenching, slow geographies, i.e., those places not connected to the network. 79 In fact, 
this “unevenness” in the territorial development of telecommunications is, as Rutherford et al. 
argue, crucial in understanding the development of these markets as a whole. 80 The geopolitics 
of pipelines as an infrastructure is more akin to “rhizomatic form of interspatial 
interconnectivity.” 81 
CONCLUSION 
In the first, and now second, decades of the twenty-first century, the geopolitical narratives 
summarised earlier in this piece have continued to influence how political actors, journalists, 
bloggers, and even some academics view the geography of Eurasia. The “fetishisation of 
territory” endemic to these narratives often means that the messiness of spatial interconnectivity 
in Eurasia is glossed over in favour of reflexive references to heartlands, pivot areas, and spheres 
of influence. At the same time, “network-centrism” is not an adequate corrective. Flows and 
fixed aspects of space coexist and are mutually constitutive; they are not diametrically opposed. 
We propose that Nord Stream, along with other existing and proposed pipeline projects, 
constitutes an underappreciated form of spatial interconnectivity, and study of these projects can 
serve to enrich how geographers and others conceptualise Eurasian space, as well as energy 
relationships more broadly. Territory and network considered in tandem, we argue, provide a 
much more powerful, and more accurate, description of geographical reality. 
A pipeline – even one built under the sea – is hardly immune to territorial frictions. Thus, the 
challenge is to conceptualise Nord Stream in both of its roles: as an a-territorial network and as 
materially tied to the places it serves and through which it passes. As an entry into engaging this 
challenge, we propose a new conceptual cartography of Eurasia – a rapidly evolving, and 
effectively “splintered” networked infrastructure. Widely held notions of geopolitics that 
emphasise proximity, territorial hegemony, and state-centric international relations must be 
complicated. Many questions remain that have not been addressed in this short piece. Our focus 
on one pipeline leaves open questions of what changing market dynamics – including the fact 
that natural gas is increasingly becoming integrated into a global market, where regional supply 
issues can have almost immediate impacts on prices around the world – means for the geography 
of this network. Future questions for us also include what this new cartography might mean for a 
politics of European integration 82 and notions of “territorial cohesion,” particularly in those 
areas lying outside the privileged core. 
In the meantime, we would suggest that retrograde renderings of pipeline and energy politics in 
Eurasia are too easy. Yet the early appeal and enduring impact of geopoliticians such as Sir 
Halford Mackinder were rooted in a marriage between geostrategic world views and 
geoeconomic calculation, and certainly there is much more room for critical analysis of the 
pipeline geopolitics in Eurasia and elsewhere. 83 By bringing the networked infrastructure of 
pipelines together with geopolitics, this paper confronts the territorial logics of contemporary 
understandings of Russia's role as energy provider by interrogating the provision of gas to 
Europe via a new pipeline. 
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